AngellPark Add-Ons: January 2005

Monday, January 03, 2005

British Case Law (General) and Legislation Websites

There are several general case law and legislation databases some of which are free and some of which are subscription. They are in the rough order I use them. Please note these sites cover all areas of the law; there is another page on this website for specific case law areas. Please also notes any comments made are mine and based on my own research and as such are necessarily limited.

Free Resources

BAILII

The best and possibly the forerunner of a genuinely comprehensive free legal database is the British and Irish Legal Information Institute which is the brainchild of Laurie West-Knights QC and accomplished using the Australian model developped by AUSTLII. The idea is to have all judgments and legislation on one site with one search engine paid for by "stakeholders" (including the government), not the users. All the State's legal resources which are free have been collated onto BAILII (e.g. House of Lords, HMSO), so while I will put on the individual website details I find it best to search from BAILII first

Pros: Easily the best search engine (especially for full text search), best inter-referencing (e.g. amendments to legislation), quick
Cons: Reports a few months behind where it depends on commercial transcribers (e.g. CA), no summaries

HMSO

All the government's sites seem to have got much better in the past two years or so - mind you they were woeful before. HMSO have collated all the Acts of Parliament since 1988, Statutory Instruments since 1987, Local Acts since 1991 and various peripheral material. They have been promising since at least 1999 to put all English statutes online in a consolidated form within a reasonable amount of time but have so far only got to the eighties.

Pros: What they have is good, reasonably quick and efficent search engine
Cons: Not consolidated, doesn't go back very far, searches can produce large amounts of dross, breaks up Acts into short bits meaning one has to constantly jump in and out of links

House of Lords

One of the first (1996), if not the first, State legal resources online which is reflected in the higher judiciary's keenness to promote online law (particularly Lord Savile and Lord Justice Brooke).

Pros: Comprehensive from 1996, Judgements are posted very quickly
Cons: No dedicated search engine (they use the UK parliament website one), breaks up judgements into short bits

Court Service

This contains a selection (seemingly random) of Court of Appeal decisions, Chancery, Family and QB decisions and 3 Supreme Court Costs decisions. While it used to be embarrassing (it had 2 decisions for the Court of Appeal (Criminal Division) for about 4 years), it has recently picked up but I think BAILII has almost everything it has.

Pros: Can't think of any
Cons: Use BAILII

ICLR Daily Law Notes

A service provided by the RCJ and the ECJ which provides daily up to date summaries of high profile cases. The summaries however are very short but provide enough information to be able to hit another website with at least a case name to find the full text or report.

Pros: Very up to date and comprehensive from a range of Courts
Cons: Very limited information

Hansard

Not strictly case law or legislation but since Pepper v Hart (and the recent case of Montila in the House of Lords) has to be considered. Arguably it is relevant to most cases about recent legislation as the sheer volume and pace at which it is drafted and passed means that any hint as to how to resolve the apparent contradictons within a statute can only be gratefully received. The link above is to Hansard but I am also including a link to the Parliament Website which contains bills and other useful information which is probably best placed here.

Pros: Comprehensive
Cons: Only since 1988

Judicial Studies Board

Very useful website particularly for criminal practitioners as it has the JSB Specimen directions. it also has various handbooks (in all areas) including the Competence handbook for Chairs of Tribunals. I am not going to mention pros or cons save to say it is a considerable improvement on the old JSB site and is well designed and quick.

Subscription Resources

Lawtel

Used to have a bad search engine and still suffers a bit from bad cross-referencing and a limited age of cases but quite useful especially for High Court and Court of Appeal Judgements.

Pros: Very up to date, provides summaries and full text judgements meaning searches can be more easily focussed for the amateur
Cons: Discussed above

Casetrack

Smith Bernal have put the judgements of the High Court and Court of Appeal that they transcribe on this database (for some reason not clear to a mere criminal hack the transcribers own the copyright on judgements - but they have been generous in releasing judgements to BAILII). Used to have an appalling search engine but the whole site has been revamped. However its full text search is still not great and it helps to know exactly what case you are looking for. It is also limited to its own transcriptions and my understanding is that other transcribers work in the High Court and the Court of Appeal so it is not comprehensive (though I believe it is at least 60% of all judgments at the RCJ).

Pros: Right up to date judgements with full text
Cons: Limited, bad search engine

If anybody has a comment or correction please reply through the comments box.

British Case Law (Specific Areas) Websites

Crime

Judicial Studies Board Specimen Directions

Court of Appeal Sentence Guideline cases (from the Sentencing Guidelines Counsel)

Employment

Employment Appeal Tribunal - best searched through BAILII

Social Security

Social Security Commissioners - some decisions which I can find are not here

Immigration

Immigration Appeal Tribunal
(please note the search is a re-direct to BAILII but there are some decisions directly on the site)

Other areas will be added in time.

General

The Bar Council

The Bar Directory

The Law Society

Sunday, January 02, 2005

Adepoju v Whitbread

EMPLOYMENT APPEAL TRIBUNAL
58 VICTORIA EMBANKMENT, LONDON EC4Y 0DS

At the Tribunal
On 11 May 2001

Before
HER HONOUR JUDGE A WAKEFIELD
MISS A MACKIE OBE
MS G MILLS

MS A A ADEPOJU APPELLANT

WHITBREAD PLC T/A WHITBREAD HOTELS RESPONDENT

Transcript of Proceedings

JUDGMENT

Revised

APPEARANCES

For the Appellant
MR CHANDRA SEKAR
(Of Counsel)
Free Representation Unit
4th Floor
Peer House
814 Verulam Street
London WC1X 8LZ
For the Respondent
MR SIMON GORTON
(Of Counsel)
Messrs Weightmans Solicitors
41 Spring Gardens
Manchester
M2 2BG

JUDGE A WAKEFIELD

1. This is an appeal by Ms Alice Adepoju against a decision of an Employment Tribunal sitting at London North on 16 May 2000, whereby it was determined, as a preliminary point, that she was not an employee of the Respondent within the definition of Section 230(1) of the Employment Rights Act 1996.

2. In the Originating Application presented on 9 March 2000, the Appellant made complaints in respect of breach of contract, discrimination and unfair dismissal. She had done work for the Respondent as a waitress between September 1988 and 20 December 1999 when the arrangement was terminated by the Respondents.

3. The appeal is made as permitted by a judgement of this Appeal Tribunal at a hearing on 15 November 2000, on grounds of the inadequacy of the Employment Tribunal decision as regards the parties being able to understand the reasoning and basis for the Employment Tribunal’s conclusions.

4. In the extended reasons for the decision, the Employment Tribunal stated a number of propositions in paragraphs 1-5 which are apparently findings of fact, although it is not so stated expressly, nor is there any reference to the evidence on the basis of which such findings were made.

5. The Chairman’s notes of evidence, which were provided pursuant to an order of this Appeal Tribunal, have not been of great assistance to us. Since they reflect what was apparently a hearing which took in excess of three hours, we are very surprised at the brevity of the notes and the absence of any reference in them to legal submissions made by the parties’ representatives.
6. Having set out the apparent findings of fact in paragraphs 1-5 of the decision, the Employment Tribunal then stated that they were referred to four authorities which are named with references. The reasons for the Tribunal’s conclusions do not however give any hint of the way, if any, in which those authorities were relevant to the decision they had to make, nor are any propositions of law stated to which the Tribunal deferred in reaching their decision.

7. The conclusion of the Employment Tribunal as to the status of the Applicant is set out under the heading “Generally”. In a crucial sentence the decision states:

“We find that she is not an employee, primarily because there was there was no lack of mutuality in the relationship.”

The double negative is clearly a typographical error.

8. While this Tribunal accepts that an Employment Tribunal decision does not have to be an elaborate formalistic product of refined legal draughtsmanship, as stated by Lord Justice Bingham in Meek v City of Birmingham District Council [1987] IRLR 250, it is essential that the Employment Tribunal provides the parties with the material which will enable them to know that no error of law has been made in the progress to its conclusions, both in terms of the findings of fact and of the application of the law to those facts.

9. We are not satisfied that in this case the Employment Tribunal adequately performed that task. Without ourselves going into the merits of the Appellant’s claim to have had a contract of employment with the Respondent, we consider that the decision of the Employment Tribunal is so defective in content that an error of law has been demonstrated.

10. The preliminary point on the Appellant’s Originating Application must therefore be remitted to be reheard by a differently constituted Employment Tribunal.

R(G) 2/00

W had claimed widows benefit following the death of her husband (“H2”) who had worked in Britain for 19 years until his death. She had been married to H1but he had divorced her by a “bare” talak in 1971. In 1973 she married H2 with whom she had had tow children though she had never come to Britain. The DSS refused widow’s benefit on the basis that the bare talak was not a valid divorce under Pakistani, East Pakistani or Bangla deshi law and so she had not the capacity to marry H2. At first instance W won on the basis of expert reports on Bangladeshi family law that the marriage was valid as notification procedures for a talak divorce could not be carried out as there was no infrastructure in Bangladesh permitting this due to the civil war. The DSS appealed as all three previous decisions of the Commissioners had not been followed. W won the appeal on the basis that foreign law was a question of fact and so there was no jurisdiction to hear the appeal and the learned Commissioner distinguished all three previous decisions of the Commissioners.

CIB 16092/96 *45/98

Starred decision that established that any applicant for incapacity credits was entitled at the time they received the benefit notwithstanding a provision that said they were to be examined within 12 weeks as to the their eleigibility. Because they received the benefit that meant they were entitled at that stage and therefore the medical examination and any subsequent decision on the claim was a review of the decision by the DSS and subject to the law in that regard, including that the burden of proof reverted to the DSS of showing that the claimant was not entitled to benefit. Relied on subsequently in a similar decision in relation to incapacity benefit.

R V UKCC ex.p CJ [2001]

A nurse was disciplined and a UKCC hearing invoked to consider whether to strip her of her UKCC registration (which would mean she couldn’t practice). She did not lose her registration but was cautioned for 5 years. It was said on her behalf that this was an inconsistent (if not perverse) verdict and sentence on the evidence that had been heard. The Board held to their decision and were asked for reasons based on the common law reasons case R v $ex p.Doody which request was refused. A JR was commenced but was quashed by consent on the basis of Brabazon-Denning (which was behind in the pipeline but due to procedural difficulties with our case was heard first) which argued the same point about the common law duty to give reasons for a decision of a public body.

O & O CICB

O & O C.I.C.B. London (Hugh Carlisle QC, Geoffrey Nice QC, Daniel Hollis QC)
O1: £4000 General Damages O2: £1750 General Damages

The Os were brothers (of African origin) who visited a nightclub in Essex in 1995. Inside the nightclub the brothers split up and O1 was subjected to an unprovoked racial attack with a bottle which was not witnessed by O2. As O1 ran out after the perpetrator O2 was made aware of the situation and saw O1 with a large amount of blood coming out of a wound to his head. O1 claimed to the Board for a 1” permanent scar and a series of smaller permanent scars on his face. He also claimed for nervous shock. O2 claimed for nervous shock on the basis of seeing his brother’s injuries, whose psychiatric effect (of sleeplessness, nightmares and anxiety attacks) was exacerbated by the attack being racially motivated and unprovoked, resulting in his feeling anxious whenever he was in the company of white people since the incident and a general feeling of distrust of white people.

Saturday, January 01, 2005

Precedents (must be logged on user)

Under Construction

Pro Bono

I have done work for FRU as an advocate since my second term of CPE in 1993 and continue to be a representative (my longest case I picked up in 1993 and finished in 2001!). I was Chair in 1996-97, Secretary in 1994-95, 1995-96, and Treasurer in 1997-98. I recommend that any aspiring advocate could not get better experience than to do cases for FRU and that they would find it a very rewarding experience, personally and in their career (link). Being an outsider to the law when I was trying to become a barrister I do not think I would have made it had I not had the training I had from the caseworkers and the experience I got doing real cases with real people in real Tribunals.

I have also done other legal voluntary work which includes work with the CRE, Hammersmith and Fulham Law Centre, Inquest and the Rolan Adams Family Campaign (a racist killing in South-East London in 1991). I have also assisted my brother on his cases including the Cardiff 3, Mills & Poole, Satpal Ram and many others (see Satish Sekar link).

Conditional Fee Agreement

CONDITIONAL FEE AGREEMENT

AGREEMENT BETWEEN:

CHANDRA SEKAR (Counsel)

-and-

PROFESSIONAL CLIENT (Solicitors)

THE NATURE OF THE AGREEMENT

1. This agreement forms the basis upon which instructions are accepted by Counsel from the Professional Client to act on a Conditional Fee basis for the Client in his/her Claim against the Respondent.

DEFINITIONS

2. In this agreement “Counsel” means Mr Chandra Sekar.

3. “The Professional Client” means Professional Client Solicitors.

4. “Chambers” means Angell Park Chambers, Unit 11 Amberley Court, Angell Road, London, SW9 7HL.

5. The “Client” is MR LAY CLIENT.

6. The “Respondent” is RESPONDENT LIMITED.

7. The “Claim” is for Unfair Dismissal, Race, Sex and Disability Discrimination.

8. “Brief” means all the essential papers in the case including:

a. IT1 (Application);

b. IT3 (Notice of Appearance);

c. Any additional pleadings (Amendments to the IT1 and/or IT3, Requests for Further Particulars and responses, etc);

d. All documents thus far disclosed by the Respondent;

e. Instructions from client and their documents;

f. Full statement of loss and position from complaint to the present and future financially of the lay client;

g. All Correspondence between the parties;

h. Court orders, directions and correspondence (including if applicable previous appeal decisions);

i. Any other relevant material (including if applicable any explanation of lateness with any application).

SCOPE OF THIS AGREEMENT

9. This relates to the Full Merits Hearing and terminates when:

a. the claim is won, lost or otherwise concluded; or

b. this agreement is terminated.

c. For the avoidance of doubt, this agreement does not cover appeals, proceedings to enforce any award or interlocutory work such as:

i. directions hearings; or

ii. pleadings.

nor any separate agreement as to instructions and remuneration to Counsel for such matters.

10. This agreement is a contract at law. The relationship of Counsel and the Professional Client shall be governed by the Terms of Work under which Barristers offer their services to persons licensed by the Law Society, save that where such terms of work are inconsistent with the Code of Conduct of the Bar of England and Wales, the Code of Conduct shall prevail.

11. Counsel must be provided with:

a. A copy of the Conditional Fee Agreement/Contingency Fee Agreement between the Professional Client and the Client;

b. The brief;

c. all relevant papers and risk assessment material, including all advice from experts and other Solicitors or Barristers to the Client in respect of the claim, which is currently available to the Professional Client;

d. any offers of settlement already made by the Client or the Respondent.

12. The Professional Client confirms that the Client has consented to the terms and conditions set out in this agreement insofar as they relate to the Client.

13. Counsel is not bound to act on a Conditional Fee basis until he has signed this agreement.

OBLIGATIONS OF COUNSEL

14. Counsel agrees to act diligently on all proper instructions from the Professional Client subject to paragraph 14 hereof.

15. Counsel is not bound to accept instructions outside the scope of this agreement.

16. Instructions are deemed to include instructions to Counsel to advise on settlement (whether orally or in writing).

OBLIGATIONS OF THE PROFESSIONAL CLIENT

17. The Professional Client agrees:

a. promptly to supply a copy of this agreement to the Client;

b. to comply with each and every Order or Direction by the Employment Tribunal within the time stipulated;

c. to act diligently in all dealings with Counsel and the prosecution of the claim;

d. to consult Counsel on the need for advice and action following:

i. the service of Originating Application(s) and/or Notice(s) of Appearance; and

ii. requests for Further and Better Particulars;

iii. to deliver within a reasonable time papers reasonably requested by Counsel for consideration;

e. promptly to bring to Counsel’s attention:

i. any offer to settle;

ii. any evidence, information or communication which may materially affect the merits of any issue in the case; and

iii. any other factor coming to the Professional Client’s attention which may affect Counsel’s entitlement to success fees, whether before or after the termination of this agreement;

iv. Any settlement reached or quantum ordered by the Tribunal (should Counsel not attend the quantum hearing);

f. promptly to communicate to the Client any advice given by Counsel:

i. to make, accept or reject any offer;

ii. to incur or not to incur expenditure in obtaining evidence or preparing the case;

iii. that the case is likely to be lost; and

iv. that the damages and costs recoverable on success make it unreasonable or uneconomic for the action to proceed;

g. promptly to inform Counsel’s clerk (and Counsel) of any listing for trial;

h. to deliver the brief not less than 2 weeks before the trial;

i. when drawing up a costs bill at any stage of the claim, to include in it a claim for interest on Counsel’s fees.

COMMENCEMENT OF AGREEMENT

18. By signing and today returning to Counsel the last page of this agreement by fax or e-mail with a recognisable and authorised signature (authority being confirmed on the e-mail), the Professional Client agrees to instruct Counsel under the terms of this agreement and undertakes to furnish Counsel within 14 days of today with hard copies of the signed agreement together with any documents under Paragraph 11 of this agreement which are not already in Counsel’s possession. Save for the operation of Paragraph 19 without such page Counsel is not instructed according to Code of Conduct.

19. Where there is:

a. An oral agreement between Counsel and the Professional Client to conduct the case on a CFA; and

b. The fees have been agreed; and

c. The written agreement is not signed and/or exchanged by either or both parties prior to the hearing in question (prior to the hearing);

This agreement is deemed to have been signed in the terms of this agreement prior to the hearing if Counsel appears for the lay client at the hearing.

TERMINATION OF THIS AGREEMENT BY COUNSEL

20. Counsel may terminate the agreement if:

a. Counsel discovers that the Professional Client is in breach of any of the obligations set out in Paragraph 15 hereof;

b. The Professional Client or the Client rejects Counsel’s advice in any respect set out in Paragraph 15 (7) hereof;

c. Counsel is informed or discovers the existence of any set-off or counterclaim which materially affects the likelihood of success and / or the amount of financial recovery in the event of success;

d. Counsel is informed or discovers the existence of information which has been falsified or knowingly withheld by the Professional Client or the Client, of which Counsel was not aware, and which Counsel could reasonably have anticipated, which materially affects the merits of any substantial issue in the case;

e. Counsel is required to cease to act by the Code of Conduct of the Bar of England and Wales, or Counsel’s professional conduct is being impugned, provided that Counsel may not terminate the agreement, if so to do would be a breach of that code and notice of any termination must be communicated promptly in writing to the Professional Client.

TERMINATION OF THIS AGREEMENT BY THE PROFESSIONAL CLIENT

21. The Professional Client may terminate the agreement at any time on the instructions of the Client.

AUTOMATIC TERMINATION OF THE AGREEMENT

22. This agreement shall automatically terminate if

a. Counsel retires from practice; or

b. the Professional Client’s agreement with the Client is terminated before the conclusion of the case; or

c. Legal Services Commission Funding is granted to the Client; and/or

d. the Client dies.

COUNSEL’S NORMAL FEES

23. Counsel’s fees upon which a success fee will be calculated (the normal fees) will be as follows:

a. Court appearances.

b. Brief Fee.

c. Trial.

i. For a trial whose estimated duration is up to 2 days (including hours of preparation) £750.00;

ii. For a trial lasting between 3 and 5 days (including hours of preparation) £1,750.00;

iii. For a trial lasting between 5 and 8 days (including hours of preparation) £ 2,500.00;

iv. For a trial lasting between 8 and 10 days (including hours of preparation) £4,000.00;

v. And a trial lasting between 10 and 15 days (including hours of preparation) £6000.00;

vi. For a trial lasting more than 16 days shall be negotiable.

d. Refreshers.

i. In accordance with Counsel’s daily rate obtaining for such work in this field, currently £ 500.00 per day.

24. Renegotiating Counsel’s Fees.

a. To the extent that the hours of preparation set out above are reasonably exceeded, then Counsel’s hourly rate will apply to each hour of additional preparation that hourly rate being £175/hr.

25. If the case is settled or goes short;

a. Counsel will consider the Professional Client’s reasonable request to reduce his brief fee set out above;

b. A settlement fee shall be payable where there is settlement prior to trial of not less than 2/3 of the brief fee.

COUNSEL’S SUCCESS FEE

26. The rate of Counsel’s success fee will be 50% of Counsel’s normal fees.

27. The reasons briefly stated for Counsel’s success fee are that, at the time of entry into this agreement:

a. the prospects of success are estimated by Counsel as (50%), as more fully set out in Counsel’s risk assessment/advice and a percentage increase of (50%) reflects those prospects.

b. the length of postponement of Counsel’s fees is estimated at …………………..year and a further increase of ………………….% applies to that postponement.

c. the reasons for Counsel’s success fee are more fully set out in Counsel’s risk assessment/advice which is not (please delete as appropriate) attached to this agreement.

COUNSEL’S ENTITLEMENT TO FEES - WINNING AND LOSING (IF THE AGREEMENT IS NOT TERMINATED)

28. Success means the same as win in the Conditional Fee Agreement/Contingency Fee Agreement between the Professional Client and the Client.

29. In the event of success, the Professional Client will pay Counsel the normal and success fees.

TRAVEL AND ACCOMODATION EXPENSES

30. If a hearing or conference takes place more than 20 miles from Counsel’s chambers the Professional Client shall pay Counsel’s travel expenses. In the event that Counsel is obliged to incur accommodation expenses, the Professional Client shall meet the cost of the accommodation so incurred by Counsel, which shall appear separately on Counsel’s fee note.

PAYMENT TERMS

31. The Professional Client agrees to pay Counsel fees owed under this agreement within 30 days of Counsel’s feenote being received;

32. For the avoidance of doubt the obligation to pay on time and in full is on the Professional Client whether there is a delay due to the lay client, or the Respondent or the Court.

33. Where there is a delay in payment interest will be charged at the Judgement rate on Counsel’s fees.

34. Where there is a delay and the reasons for it are promptly notified to Counsel will consider the Professional Client’s reasonable request to structure payment over a period of time and/or to waive whole or part of the interest owed or owable.

ERRORS AND INDEMNITY FOR FEES

35. If, because of a breach by the Professional Client but not by Counsel of his duty to the Client, the Client’s claim is struck out:

a. for non-compliance with an Interlocutory Order; or

b. for failure to exercise reasonable skill, care, or judgement, in the prosecution of the Client’s claim, the Professional Client shall pay Counsel such normal fees as would have been recoverable under this agreement.

36. If, because of a breach by Counsel but not the Professional Client of his duty to the Client, the Client’s claim is dismissed or struck out:

a. for non-compliance with an Interlocutory Order; or

b. for failure to exercise reasonable skill, care, or judgement, in the prosecution of the Client’s claim:

Counsel shall pay the Professional Client such basic costs as would have been recoverable from the Client under the Professional Client’s Agreement with the Client.

37. No payment shall be made under subparagraph (1) and (2) in respect of any breach by the Professional Client or Counsel which would not give rise to a claim for damages if an action were brought by the Client.

38. The amount payable in respect of any claim under subparagraph (1) or (2) shall be limited to the total amount recoverable by the client in the action and not more than £25,000.00 in any event.

Signed: ________________________________________________

Counsel (or by his Clerk with Counsel’s prior written authority)

Dated:

Signed: ________________________________________________

Solicitor (duly authorised) acting for the Client Principal / Employee (delete as appropriate)

NB: (see paragraph 18) By signing and today returning to Counsel the last page of this agreement by fax, the Professional Client agrees to instruct Counsel under the terms of this agreement and undertakes to furnish Counsel within 14 days of today with hard copies of the signed agreement together with any documents under Paragraph 11 of this agreement which are not already in Counsel’s possession.

Satish Sekar

My brother has been a journalist (freelance) and researcher into miscarriages of justice for some 15 years. During that period he has worked with Paddy Hill (of the Birmingham 6), Johnny Kamara, Gareth Peirce, Mike Mansfied QC, Paul Foot and many other victims of miscarriages of justice or lawyers and journalists working in this area.

His most well-known case (and a truly extraordinary story on its own account) is the Cardiff Three. In synopsis, Lynette White, a prostitute in the Cardiff Butetown district, was brutally killed with over 50 stab wounds in 1988. There was a wealth of forensic evidence and the police were initially pursuing a white suspect seen walking away from the area with a large amount of blood on him, which they publicised on Critmewatch. Several months later 5 black men were arrested and charged, and three, after the longest murder trial in British history, were convicted in November 1990. In 1992 the three were freed on appeal (reported as R v Paris 97 Cr.App.R. 99, CA, still a leading authority on oppression in interviews).

Despite being freed on appeal doubts were still expressed in the press that the Three had been freed on a "technicality", which were not helped by the South Wales Police's refusal to re-open the investigation. Satish, working with the three men and the victim's family campaigned for a full re-investigation and wrote about the case and subsequent developments in his acclaimed book "Fitted In", published in 1998.

As a result of his campaigning, including a long series of meetings with, and suggestions to, the police as to how the real killer could be found using new DNA techniques, eventually the South Wales Police re-opened the investigation in June 1999 and in January 2002 a re-screening of the original DNA samples provided usable results. In 2003 a suspect was identified. who was arrested and charged, and eventually convicted in July 2003 (Guardian story). It was the first time in British legal history that a miscarriage of justice case had been resolved and the true killer found and to date it is still the only case where this has happened. It is also the only case I know of where the victim's family and the victims of the miscarriage of justice have joined forces to prove the innocence of those originally convicted of the offence by finding the actual perpetrator and proving the adage that the only person who gains by innocent people being convicted is the actual perpetrator. It is also the case that lead to South Wales Police pioneering a new approach to major crime scene investigations and unsolved homicides, much of which was the basis of ACPO's guidelines on homicide investigations. Finally, following convictions in 2008 for perjury of three civilian witnesses identified by my brother as having given incorrect testimony at the two Cardiff 3 trials (at the time it was the most expensive case in Wales) in March 2009 13 serving and former officers of the South Wales Force were arrested and charged with conspiracy to pervert the course of justice along with a further two civilian witnesses (Guardian article).

Other notable cases Satish has worked on include Satpal Ram and Mills and Poole (another extraordinary case reported as Mills (Gary) and Poole (Anthony Keith) [1998] Crim.L.R. 64, HL), and eventually resulting in their being freed in the Court of Appeal in 2003 on a reference from the Criminal Cases Review Commission, 13 years after their original convictions - article). He has advised the Mayor of London's office on issues around policing and criminal justice and I would describe him as the best expert non-expert (in the legal sense) on DNA in Britain. He has also written on other forensic issues such as the preservation of crime scenes for the purpose of securing forensic evidence and been involved in ground-breaking work on the accurate dating of fires from plant analysis and forensic entomology.

Chandra’s other interests

Under Construction

Website Design and Credits

Any faults with this website are due to me as I have designed it and written all the copy. However I would like to thank Francis Norton who told me how to do the basics in five minutes flat on a Merry Christmas evening and Rohan Jayasekera for further hints.

AngellPark Add-Ons